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decent minimum standards. DTI want to encourage high performance 
workplaces that add value, foster innovation and offer employees skilled 
and well-paid jobs. 
The Department has an ongoing research programme on employment 
relations and labour market issues, managed by the Employment Market 
Analysis and Research branch (EMAR).  
This is one of 14 reports commissioned by DTI under the Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2004 Grants Fund. The Fund is a 
Department of Trade and Industry initiative to develop the evidence base 
in areas of policy interest, raise awareness of this survey and encourage 
advanced data analysis based on the WERS 2004 datasets. 
A call for proposals was made in November 2005. Proposals were 
selected for their contribution to the evidence base and relevance to 
government policy. The EMAR branch and the Management, Leadership 
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additional printed copies ordered from www.dti.gov.uk/publications 
Please contact us at emar@dti.gov.uk if you wish to be added to our 
publication mailing list, or would like to receive regular email updates on 
EMAR’s research, new publications and forthcoming events. 
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Executive summary 
This paper considers whether ‘fair share capitalism’ improves 
workplace productivity. ‘Fair share capitalism’ is the term used 
to describe schemes that link employee’s pay to group or 
company performance. Using data from the 2004 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey, the report finds ‘fair share 
capitalism’ can positively affect productivity in British private 
sector workplaces. 
The relationship depends on the use of a combination of ‘fair 
share capitalism’ schemes in a workplace rather than one type 
of scheme in isolation. This relationship was stronger in 
workplaces where employees had greater autonomy in decision 
making. The coverage of employees was also found to be 
significant. The effect on labour productivity was most 
pronounced when all non-managerial employees were covered; 
schemes just covering managerial staff were found to have 
little impact on workplace productivity. 
Aims and objectives 
This paper has two aims. First, it tries to further understanding of ‘fair 
share capitalism’ (FSC) and its potential impact on behaviour by 
considering the conditions under which FSC operates in British private 
sector workplaces. In particular, it focuses on the relationship between 
FSC and two theoretically important aspects of production, namely 
managerial monitoring (MM) of employee effort and autonomy in 
employee decision-making (EDM). Second, it identifies the effects of 
group incentive schemes on workplace labour productivity, and how this 
linkage differs by type of scheme, and the degree to which employees 
have autonomy in decision-making.   
Background 
In 1999, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated:  
Share ownership offers employees a real stake in their 
company…I want, through targeted reform, to reward long 
term commitment by employees. I want to encourage the 
new enterprise culture of team work in which everyone 
contributes and everyone benefits from success. 
Since then, payments made under profit-related pay schemes have 
become fully taxable, and there has been a shift towards tax breaks for 
share ownership schemes such as the Share Incentive Plan. Despite 
theoretical predictions that incentive payments can enhance productivity 
and thus company performance, there is conflicting empirical evidence 
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substantiating a link. Using cross-sectional and panel evidence from 
British private sector establishments in the Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey 2004 (WERS 2004), this paper attempts to shed some 
light on this association. 
The report’s main findings were as follows: 
• ‘Fair share capitalism’ (FSC), the financial mechanism that links 
employees’ pay to group or company performance, was positively 
associated with labour productivity.  
• Although the association varied with the measure of labour 
productivity used, results were fairly consistent across the three 
productivity measures (a subjective measure of labour productivity 
relative to the industry average; sales per employee and value added 
per employee).  
• The productivity results differed by type of FSC scheme. Share 
ownership schemes had the clearest positive association with 
productivity. However, this positive association was confined to 
instances in which share ownership schemes were combined with 
profit-related pay (PRP) or group payments-by-results (PBR) schemes. 
In isolation, share ownership was associated with lower productivity, 
as were PRP and group PBR in isolation. 
• Individual PBR, merit pay and performance-based pay schemes were 
rarely associated with higher labour productivity. 
• The positive links between FSC and labour productivity were much 
stronger in workplaces where employees had greater autonomy in 
decision-making than in those workplaces where employees had less 
autonomy in decision-making. 
• The productivity results also differed by employee coverage of FSC 
schemes. The positive association between share ownership and 
productivity was most pronounced when all non-managerial 
employees were covered by the scheme. Schemes just covering 
managerial staff were found to have little impact on workplace 
productivity. 
About this project 
This research was carried out as part of the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s employment relations research programme, and was funded 
under the WERS 2004 Grants Fund. Further details on the Fund can be 
found here:  
http://www.dti.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/grants/wers 
The research reported in this report is based on secondary analysis of 
the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). It contains 
four linked surveys, of which three were used in this research. The first 
was the cross-section survey of managers, in which data were collected 
using face-to-face interviews with 2,295 managers responsible for 
 3 
employment relations. The second was the survey of employees, in 
which over 22,000 questionnaires were returned by employees. The third 
was the 1998-2004 panel survey, in which data were collected using face-
to-face interviews with 938 managers. The panel survey is constructed 
by revisiting a sample of the workplaces that took part in the previous 
cross-section survey. Descriptive and multivariate analyses are 
undertaken to map the incidence of pay incentive schemes in British 
private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees.   
About the authors 
Alex Bryson is a Principal Research Fellow at the Policy Studies Institute 
and Manpower Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic 
Performance. Richard Freeman is a Professor in Economics at Harvard 
University, Head of the Labor Program at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for 
Economic Performance. 
About WERS 2004 
The Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2004) is a 
nationally representative survey of British workplaces employing five or 
more employees and covering all sectors of the economy except 
agriculture, fishing, mining and quarrying. More information on the 
survey can be found here: 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/wers-2004/ 
The survey is jointly sponsored by the Department of Trade and Industry, 
the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas), the Economic 
and Social Research Council and the Policy Studies Institute. It follows in 
the footsteps of earlier surveys conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998.  
For further information please refer to the main published outputs from 
WERS 2004: the first findings booklet (Kersley et al, 2005), a report on 
small and medium-sized enterprises (Forth et al, 2006), and the 400-page 
sourcebook of detailed findings (Kersley et al, 2006). The sourcebook is 
published by Routledge, while the first two reports are available free 
from DTI: http://www.dti.gov.uk/publications Please quote the URN when 
ordering. The data from WERS 2004 is now available to users through 
the UK Data Archive (study number: 5294): http://www.data-archive.ac.uk 
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1 
Introduction 
This paper considers whether ‘fair share capitalism’ (FSC) improves 
workplace productivity. Fair share capitalism is a generic term for the 
financial mechanism that links employees’ pay to group or company 
performance. In spite of increasing evidence of positive effects of FSC on 
productivity in the United States (Kruse and Blasi, 1995; Dube and 
Freeman, 2006; Freeman et al., 2006) the literature for the UK is in some 
disarray, with few empirical regularities being replicated across studies 
and over time. Consequently there is a great deal of uncertainty about 
what effects FSC has on workplace productivity.  
The paper contributes to this literature in two ways using linked 
employer-employee data from the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS). First, it tries to further understanding of FSC 
and its potential impact on behaviour by considering the conditions 
under which FSC operates in British workplaces. In particular, the focus 
is on the relationship between FSC and two theoretically important 
aspects of production, namely managerial monitoring of employee effort 
and autonomy in employee decision-making. The traditional rationale for 
FSC is that where employers find it difficult or costly to monitor inputs 
they will choose to pay for outputs. FSC can then be used to align worker 
and employer objectives in maximising those outputs, provided any free-
rider problem from group FSC can be overcome. This implies a potential 
to reduce managerial monitoring of inputs where one is able to reward 
outputs through FSC. At the same time, it seems likely that employers 
will only want to link pay to performance, and employees will only be 
prepared to shoulder the additional risk to their income of doing so, 
where there is autonomy in employee decision-making which permits 
employees to affect output.  
Our second contribution is to establish independent associations 
between FSC and labour productivity using accounting-based measures 
of productivity not hitherto used in the literature. The empirical analysis 
benefits from the use of a very rich set of FSC variables, permitting us to 
distinguish the effects of different forms of FSC and their workplace 
coverage, and from a comparison of their effects on three different 
productivity measures. 
There are two other compelling reasons for exploring these issues in the 
UK at the present time. The first is that there is a new policy interest in 
the effects of FSC on employees and performance. Since 1997 when New 
Labour came to power there has been more favourable taxation of share 
ownership schemes at the expense of profit-related pay (PRP) schemes. 
PRP schemes are now fully taxable and there are new tax breaks for 
 5 
some share ownership schemes.1 One reason for this shift in policy may 
be the expectation that share ownership can improve company 
performance. In 1998 the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (HM Treasury, 
1998: 1-2) said: 
Share ownership offers employees a real stake in their 
company…I want, through targeted reform, to reward long 
term commitment by employees, I want to encourage the 
new enterprise culture of team work in which everyone 
contributes and everyone benefits from success…Employee 
share ownership has a contribution to make towards 
increasing Britain’s productivity…Research evidence 
indicates that employee share ownership has a positive effect 
on employee productivity. 
The second compelling reason for current interest in the effects of FSC is 
that it is widespread in British private sector workplaces, as indicated in 
Table 1. The table shows the incidence and coverage of FSC in Britain as 
captured in WERS 2004 for private sector workplaces with 5 or more 
employees. Around one-fifth of workplaces had an Employee Share 
Ownership Scheme (ESOS), covering almost one third of employees. 
The most popular ESOS scheme was Save As You Earn (SAYE) followed 
by Share Incentive Plans (SIP) and Company Share Option Plans (CSOP). 
One-quarter of workplaces had some form of profit-related pay (PRP) for 
non-managerial employees, and one-quarter had some form of group-
based payment-by-results (PBR). The vast majority of share ownership 
schemes covered all non-managerial employees, as did over two-thirds 
of PRP schemes.  
For reasons that will become apparent later, PRP, group-based PBR and 
employee share-ownership are included in the measure of FSC. Half of 
all private sector workplaces had at least one such scheme, with 17 per 
cent having two and 6 per cent all three schemes. In addition, one-third 
of workplaces used some form of individual PBR with objectively 
determined performance criteria used to establish performance and 16 
per cent had merit pay where pay is related to a subjective assessment 
of individual performance by a supervisor or manager. The second 
column in Table 1 shows the percentage of employees working in 
workplaces with these schemes. The percentages are higher than those 
for workplaces in column 1 indicating that these schemes were more 
prevalent in larger workplaces.  
Table 1 also shows that one-tenth of private sector workplaces had 
introduced some form of performance-related pay over the last two 
years. In the United States shared forms of compensation (share 
ownership plans, stock options, profit and gain-sharing) have been rising 
since the 1980s, a trend that seems to have accompanied greater 
employee involvement in decision-making (Dube and Freeman, 2006). 
                                                   
1 Further details can be found at: 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/emp_share_schemes/menu.htm. 
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The trends are very different in the UK. Task discretion declined in Britain 
in the 1990s (Gallie et al., 2004). Both profit-related pay and share-
ownership schemes grew in the 1980s, with government tax incentives 
playing some part, but their incidence has remained fairly static since 
then and there has been little change in the incidence of payments-by 
results in Britain since 1990 (Bryson, 2006).2 This may account for the 
recent changes in tax treatment of FSC discussed above. 
Table 1. Fair share capitalism coverage – private sector workplaces, 
2004 
 Workplaces (%) Employees (%) 
Employee Share Ownership Schemes (ESOS): coverage 
 None 
 Managers only 
 1-99% non-managerial 
 100% non-managerial 
 
80 
3 
3 
14 
 
68 
4 
6 
22 
Employee Share Ownership Schemes (ESOS): by type 
 Share Incentive Plan (SIP) 
 Save As You Earn (SAYE) 
 Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) 
 Company Share Option Plan (CSOP) 
 Others 
 
7 
12 
<1 
6 
3 
 
11 
21 
<1 
11 
6 
Profit-related Pay (PRP): coverage 
 None 
 1-99% non-managerial 
 100% non-managerial 
 
76 
7 
16 
 
71 
12 
18 
Group Payment by Results (PBR) 26 30 
FSC count (ESOS+PRP+Group PBR): 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 
50 
27 
17 
6 
 
38 
30 
24 
9 
Individual payment by results 34 43 
Merit pay 16 26 
Performance-related pay introduced in last 2 years 10 13 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 2004.  Base: all private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees.  Figures are 
weighted and are based on 1,706 workplace respondents. 
 
Classifying workplaces according to the size of the workplace to which 
they belong, Table 2 shows that the incidence of FSC was considerably 
higher in workplaces belonging to large firms (250+ employees) than 
among workplaces belonging to small firms (<50 employees) and those 
belonging to medium-sized firms (50-249 employees).  ESOS were very 
unusual in the SME sector, yet existed in over two-fifths of workplaces 
belonging to large firms. PBR and merit pay were much more common 
in SME’s than ESOS, with around one-third of SME workplaces using at 
least one such scheme. However, they existed in over half of workplaces 
                                                   
2 There is, however, evidence to the contrary.  White et al. (2004: 89) say that over the 
1990s the proportion of employees taking part in group-based incentives rose from 5 to 
17 percent. 
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belonging to large firms. PRP was present in half of workplaces in large 
firms compared to one-quarter of SME workplaces.  
Table 2. Incidence of variable pay schemes, by firm size, 2004 
 % workplaces 
 All private 
sector 
SME’s Small Medium-sized Large 
Employee Share 
Ownership 
Schemes 
20 2 1 5 44 
Any merit/PBR: 
 Merit only: 
 PBR only: 
 Both: 
44 
9 
28 
6 
34 
8 
22 
4 
34 
8 
22 
4 
35 
6 
26 
2 
57 
11 
37 
10 
Profit-related pay 35 24 21 38 49 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004. Base: all private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees.  Figures are weighted 
and are based on 1,706 workplace respondents. 
 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section Two discusses the 
theory linking ‘fair share capitalism’ to productivity and the roles played 
by managerial monitoring of employee effort and autonomy in employee 
decision-making. Section Three reviews the existing literature. Section 
Four introduces the data. Section Five presents results and Section Six 
concludes.  
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2 
Theoretical background 
Fair share capitalism may have an impact on workplace performance 
through worker productivity. The FSC effect on productivity may arise by 
impacting both directly and indirectly on worker effort. The direct route 
is what some have termed its ‘motivational effect’ (Mitchell et al., 1990). 
This occurs if workers optimise their income by raising effort where pay 
is linked to performance. FSC induces greater effort by equating the 
marginal value of an extra unit of output with the marginal cost of 
producing it (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). This effort incentive effect 
applies to all FSC but may differ with the transparency of the link 
between individual’s performance and rewards, the degree to which the 
employee can alter pay through individual effort, and the time delay 
between assessed performance and reward.  
FSC may also have indirect effects on worker effort where it educates 
employees about the link between pay and performance, reduces fears 
that increased productivity will result in lay-off, increases identification 
with the firm or improves worker morale or job satisfaction, thus 
reducing the disutility of effort. These effects may be apparent in 
reduced absenteeism as well. Worker sorting effects may occur where 
FSC attracts more able workers or increases (reduces) the likelihood that 
the least (most) able leave (Bishop, 1987; Mitchell et al., 1990).3 In turn, 
this may raise employer incentives to invest in human capital. 
Yet, as noted above, fair share capitalism is not present in all workplaces. 
A number of reasons have been advanced as to why firms do or do not 
adopt FSC.4 For instance, the uneven distribution by firm size shown in 
Table 2 raises questions about the net benefits of FSC for SME’s which 
are akin to those raised in the context of the employee involvement and 
high commitment practice literatures (Bryson, 1999).  
Employee decision making 
However, this paper focuses on the relationship between FSC and two 
other elements in the production process which influence both the 
                                                   
3 Worker sorting effects may be beneficial to the firm but detrimental to other 
employers, leading to ambiguous outcomes for the economy as a whole. 
4 Empirical studies identify a variety of reasons that employers give for introducing FSC 
(Bryson and Millward, 1997). These include enhancing worker conditions (Osterman, 
1994); managers wishing to make a name for themselves (Marchington et al., 1993); 
and recruitment and retention (Kessler and Purcell, 1992). In the USA Employee Share 
Option Plans (ESOP’s) are used by employers as a tax efficient employee benefit, to 
raise productivity and as a way of warding off takeovers (Kruse and Blasi, 1995).  It 
seems that employers rarely evaluate productivity gains of schemes to involve 
employees (Loveridge, 1980; Kessler and Purcell, 1992). 
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incidence of FSC and productivity, namely employee decision-making 
(EDM) and managerial monitoring (MM) of employee inputs. Theoretical 
considerations would lead us to expect a positive relationship between 
EDM and FSC which, if unaccounted for in empirical analysis, might lead 
to biased estimates of FSC links to productivity. The link between 
managerial monitoring and FSC is more ambiguous, as outlined below, 
but again, its omission from empirical investigation could bias estimates 
of the FSC-productivity link. 
Employers may offer substantial decision-making autonomy when the 
worker is capable of making better decisions than a supervisor or 
manager, for instance where the employee has ‘private’ information 
about the production process. In these circumstances the employer will 
seek to align the worker’s decision-making with the employer’s interests 
by offering an incentive to make the ‘right’ decisions, as principal-agent 
theory would suggest. FSC may also be used as an incentive for workers 
to share their ‘private’ information about the production process with the 
employer (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Jones, 1987). FSC financial incentives 
can also compensate employees for what they might perceive to be 
higher levels of job responsibility that come with decision-making 
autonomy, thus raising the net benefits from this additional investment. 
One might therefore expect a positive productivity effect arising from the 
combination of FSC and EDM. Without these financial incentives EDM 
might have negative effects on worker motivation (Ben-ner and Jones, 
1995) and FSC may have little or no effect on productivity. The empirical 
analysis presented in this paper tests the proposition that FSC effects on 
productivity differ with the extent of EDM.  
Managerial monitoring of employee effort 
Turning to the relationship between FSC and managerial monitoring, the 
common assumption is that employers will choose to pay employees via 
FSC where effort is not observable, or is very costly to observe, but 
outputs can be monitored. A piece-rate which allows the worker to 
decide how much to work and thus how much to get paid obviates the 
need for monitoring inputs (Simon, 1951). One might therefore anticipate 
a negative correlation between FSC and monitoring inputs for, as Marx 
remarked:  
Since the quality and intensity of work are…controlled by the 
form of the wage itself, the superintendence of labour 
becomes to a great extent superfluous (Marx, 1976: 695).  
In practice pure piece-rate pay is confined to occupations where 
monitoring inputs can be costly or difficult but outputs can easily be 
observed, such as salespeople working for commission and fruit pickers. 
Since pay for performance is usually combined with a fixed wage, 
employees retain some discretion about the effort they put in so that the 
problem of worker shirking still provides a rationale for MM. 
Furthermore, from an alternative theoretical perspective MM and FSC 
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can both be characterised as means of controlling workers.5 Frederick 
Taylor viewed output-based pay as an additional mechanism for the 
avoidance of shirking (what he termed “soldiering”).  Edwards (1979) 
identifies payments-by-results as one aspect of the ‘technical control’ 
over workers prescribed by ‘scientific management’, one which may 
complement control through close supervision (‘personal control’) and 
through adherence to norms and codes, often embodied in appraisal, 
through which job progression is assured (‘bureaucratic control’). Thus, 
it is possible that MM and FSC are complementary rather than 
substitutes.6 This possibility appears more likely with the advent of ICT-
based monitoring, including on-line monitoring, electronic point-of-sale 
equipment and electronic time recording, which has substantially 
reduced the cost of previously difficult-to-monitor jobs. White et al. 
(2004: 100) estimated that in 2002 ICT-based monitoring systems were 
‘already covering around half the workforce and appear to be spreading 
rapidly’. What is more, half of the workplaces with ICT monitoring were 
using it to evaluate individuals (op. cit., 96). This trend suggests that the 
traditional perception of a negative relationship between MM and FSC 
may no longer hold. 
Group-based performance pay 
From the employer’s perspective, group-based performance pay has an 
advantage over individual performance-based pay where the employer 
values coordinated work or the sharing of new ways to improve 
productivity. Group-based performance pay may also be appropriate 
where it is difficult to monitor individual workers’ contribution to output. 
However, where FSC is based on group performance and the size of pay-
offs matters to workers, rather than the existence of the pay/performance 
link per se, a free-rider problem arises since the income-sharing reward 
from worker effort is diluted by 1/n where n is the number of employees 
in the group (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). In the classic Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game workers choose to shirk if extra effort is undesirable and 
they do not know how others will behave (Blinder, 1990). However, in a 
repeat game scenario workers may punish or ostracize shirkers such that 
worker effort is self-enforcing. This may lead to higher output than a 
payment system without FSC and may also avoid incurring MM costs 
(Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). 
                                                   
5 There is a long tradition of viewing performance-related pay in this way in Britain.  
Thus, originators of the British Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys reported their 
findings on payments-by-results (PBR) under the heading ‘Systems of payment and 
control’ alongside methods for controlling time keeping and payments while sick 
(Daniel and Millward, 1983: 200).  They went on to argue (1983: 205): “Traditionally the 
purpose of PBR systems of pay has been to encourage workers to increase effort and 
output….In practice….there has been a tendency for PBR to become more an 
instrument of management control designed to ensure consistency of output.” In the 
Donovan tradition, PBR was treated as part of the problem of shop floor bargaining and 
a cause of industrial strife (Daniel and Millward, 1983: 292). 
6 Gallie et al. (1998) show that control of workers through close supervision, pay 
incentives and appraisal systems all grew in Britain in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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This paper does not consider the role of worker preferences in the 
incidence and impact of FSC, other than with respect to the unit at which 
performance is measured. The optimal contract will balance the 
employer’s desire for increased effort with the worker’s concern about 
exposure of income to risk.7 Worker concern about risk will be greater 
where pay is exposed to variability beyond the worker’s direct influence.  
Thus worker concerns about income risk will be least pronounced where 
FSC is set at a level where the employee has greater influence over 
outcomes, that is, where it is individual, team or group based 
(Prendergast, 2002). Therefore one might anticipate stronger incentive 
effects where group-level FSC is set at a level that workers can influence, 
namely team or group-level as opposed to workplace or organization-
level. 
The impact on workplace productivity 
The link between FSC and workplace productivity is not clear a priori, in 
spite of the potential positive effects noted above. First, FSC has the 
potential to demotivate workers. Sharing returns may reduce managers’ 
incentive to manage (Jensen and Meckling, 1979). Increased ownership 
can result in an expectations gap if influence doesn’t follow (Kruse and 
Blasi, 1995). Employees may perceive the pay/performance link to be 
unfair if, for instance, performance is measured with error or employees 
have not been consulted about the criteria governing the scheme 
(Marsden, 2004). Second, it may not be optimal to involve employees in 
the decision-making that might come with FSC (Jones, 1987). Employees 
may not be best placed to make decisions (Loveridge, 1980). Third, the 
pay-off to performance may not be large enough to induce greater 
discretionary effort on the part of workers. For example, the employer 
may limit the extent to which pay can vary with performance where the 
costs of obtaining productivity information are high, or when skills are 
firm-specific, reducing workers’ outside options, thus inducing employer 
to moderate compensation for productivity. 
The human resource management (HRM) literature offers some 
theoretical insights into the potential impact of FSC on firm productivity 
and performance. Although it is possible that FSC constitutes a ‘best 
practice’ and, as such, may have positive effects across most firms, the 
literature highlights the importance of interactions between practices 
and the context within which a firm operates. The ‘comprehensiveness 
thesis’ suggests any positive effect of FSC on performance will be 
positively correlated with the extent of its adoption (Ichniowski et al, 
1996). The empirical analysis will test this proposition with one such 
measure, namely the percentage of employees covered by the scheme.  
The ‘complementarities thesis’ suggests practices are most effective 
when bundled with supportive practices (Pil and MacDuffie, 1996). In the 
case of FSC these practices might include EDM, as noted earlier. 
                                                   
7 The optimal mix of base and variable pay is a function of degree of risk aversion and 
elasticity of output with respect to effort (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). 
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Following on from the discussion above, supportive practices may or 
may not include MM. The ‘contingencies thesis’ emphasises the role of 
contextual factors. Thus FSC may need to ‘fit’ with the firm’s competitive 
strategy (Huselid, 1995; Schuler and Jackson, 1987). For example, it may 
be that firms competing on the basis of quantity and price, and not on 
the quality of output, will adopt individual piece-rates as their preferred 
method of performance-related pay. More broadly the costs and benefits 
of FSC may vary across firms as is the case with HRM in general, which 
is one reason why its spread across firms is uneven (Bryson et al., 2005). 
If the costs associated with FSC are high one might observe an effect of 
FSC on labour productivity that does not carry over to the firm’s 
performance.8 A positive effect on productivity but not on performance 
would also be consistent with scenarios in which employees were able 
to reap the rewards of higher marginal productivity through higher 
wages. 
 
                                                   
8 For instance, the time and cost in consulting and informing employees must be 
weighed against the additional information flowing to managers (Levine and Tyson, 
1990).   
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3 
Previous evidence 
This section reviews the effects of fair share capitalism on workplace 
productivity and workplace performance, even though the empirical 
analysis concentrates on productivity. The review focuses primarily on 
research in Great Britain. This research is dominated by studies of the 
Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) that have been 
undertaken in 1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 and 2004. In these surveys the 
traditional measures of performance and productivity are subjective 
ordinal measures taken from HR managers which relate the performance 
or productivity of the respondents’ workplace to the average for the 
industry. These measures, which are described in more detail below, are 
therefore concerned with performance of a workplace relative to an 
industry average, although there are some studies that analyse 
productivity levels and profit levels as outcomes. The empirical analysis 
presented later uses a subjective measure of productivity relative to the 
industry average and two accounting measures of labour productivity 
levels. 
Profit-related pay and workplace performance and productivity 
Early studies relating profit-related pay (PRP) to financial performance 
found no significant effect (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988) or a one-off 
positive effect (Bhargava, 1994). Subsequent studies have focused on the 
interaction between PRP, other FSC mechanisms and other HRM 
practices. Using WERS cross-sectional data for 1990 and 1998 and panel 
data for the period 1990-98 McNabb and Whitfield (1998, 2000) found 
significant interactions between PRP and share-ownership as well as 
interactions between PRP and employee involvement practices. 
However, these effects differed across their data sets. Using WERS data 
for 1998 Addison and Belfield (2000) were unable to replicate the results 
McNabb and Whitfield had obtained with 1990 data. Using 1990 WERS 
data Bryson (1999) finds positive effects of PRP are confined to 
workplaces belonging to large firms. In workplaces belonging to small 
firms the positive effects were confined to those engaged in broader 
employee involvement initiatives. Most recently Conyon and Freeman 
(2004) estimated PRP effects with WERS cross-sectional and panel data 
for 1990 and 1998, as well as for a firm-level panel. Panel fixed effects 
suggested the positive effect of PRP on stock returns was due to 
unobserved firm characteristics. In WERS 1998 cross-sectional data the 
incidence of PRP was positively and significantly associated with 
performance, as was the percentage of employees covered by PRP. A 
switch towards PRP in the 1990-98 WERS panel was also correlated with 
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improved performance. Interactions with communication and 
consultation were not significant. 
Studies of productivity tend to find positive effects for PRP. Cable and 
Wilson (1989) identified positive effects of PRP in isolation and a positive 
effect in conjunction with employee involvement practices. Wadhwani 
and Wall (1990) found weak positive effects. Using WERS 1990 Fernie 
and Metcalf (1995) found FSC (mainly PRP) interactions with non-
financial participation were crucial and differed in the union (positive) 
and non-union (negative) sectors. Effects on productivity also differed 
across PRP schemes: those with immediate payouts had positive effects 
for productivity growth whereas deferred payment schemes had no 
significant effect.  More recently Robinson and Wilson (2006) analysed 
effects for a panel of manufacturing firms over the period 1988-1991. 
They found no PRP effects in isolation, but positive effects on 
productivity where there was a high level of MM. Conyon and Freeman 
(2004) found positive effects of tax approved PRP controlling for firm 
fixed effects. There were no significant interactions with information 
sharing or consultation. A negative effect of PRP schemes covering non-
managers only is presented in tables but not commented on in the text. 
Conyon and Freeman (2004) also found positive effects of both PRP 
incidence and higher PRP coverage on productivity growth.9 
Share-ownership schemes and workplace performance and productivity 
British evidence on the effects of share ownership on financial 
performance is mixed. Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) find no 
significant effects using WERS cross-sectional data for 1984. Using 
WERS 1990 Bryson (1999) finds this non-significant effect holds for 
workplaces belonging to small and larger firms. Using cross-sectional 
and panel WERS data for 1990 and 1998 McNabb and Whitfield (1998, 
2000) find share ownership per se is not significant but its interactions 
with other practices are. However, these interaction effects are unstable 
across data sets. Addison and Belfield’s (2000) study using WERS 1998 
also finds interaction effects are significant but their results differ from 
those obtained by McNabb and Whitfield, raising further questions about 
the stability of interaction effects across data sets and over time. Conyon 
and Freeman (2004) find the presence of share ownership is positively 
associated with performance in WERS 1998, the effect rising with the 
percentage of employees covered. However, in their firm-level panel 
                                                   
9 Evidence on PRP’s effect on financial performance from other countries is generally 
positive, though far from overwhelming and holds irrespective of interactions with 
employee involvement practices.  (See Doucouliagos et al. (1995) for a meta-analysis; 
Weitzman and Kruse (1990), Cooke (1994) and Card (1990) for the United States).  
Turning to labour productivity Estrin et al. (1987) review evidence in the OECD and find 
that profit shares constituting 5-10 per cent of market wages elicited a 6 per cent rise in 
productivity.  For the United States Kruse (1993) finds cash plans have greater effect 
than deferred plans and that effects rise with the percentage of pay dependent on 
profits.  Cooke (1994) finds positive effects in a sample of small, non-union 
manufacturing firms, whether PRP is used with team-working or not. 
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analysis the positive effects of tax approved all-employee share option 
schemes become non-significant with the introduction of firm fixed 
effects. 
Share ownership effects on labour productivity are also mixed. Using 
WERS 1990, Fernie and Metcalf (1995) find no significant effects on 
productivity levels or growth. Robinson and Wilson (2006), on the other 
hand, find positive effects for their panel of manufacturing firms over the 
period 1988-1991 (using pooled regression and panel estimation). 
However, the effects vary with technology. They also find a positive 
interaction with MM. Conyon and Freeman (2004) find positive effects of 
tax-approved share schemes emerge having controlled for firm fixed 
effects, indicating that in their sample these positive effects were 
correlated with unobserved firm effects that negatively affected 
productivity. They found no evidence of differential effects for 
managerial only versus non-managerial schemes, nor any evidence of 
interactions with information sharing or consultation. In their WERS 
analyses they found a positive effect of share ownership on productivity 
levels which rose with the percentage of non-managerial employees 
covered, but these effects were not significant for productivity growth. In 
the WERS 1990-98 Panel, switching to share ownership was associated 
with improved productivity.10 
Payments-by-results and workplace performance and productivity 
Other forms of payments-by-results (PBR) have attracted less attention 
than PRP and share ownership in spite of their high incidence in Britain 
as indicated in Tables 1 and 2. Those studies that have considered PBR 
effects have used WERS. Bryson (1999) used WERS 1990 and focused on 
financial performance: he found no effects for merit pay but positive 
effects of individual PBR which were confined to small-firm workplaces. 
Fernie and Metcalf (1995), using the same data but concentrating on 
productivity, found a positive effect of merit pay on productivity growth 
but no other PBR effects. Conyon and Freeman (2004) used WERS 1998 
to consider PBR effects on productivity and financial performance. They 
found positive effects of group-based PBR for productivity growth, but 
no other PBR effects. 
Summary 
In summary, the evidence from the literature on FSC and financial 
performance suggests FSC has a positive influence, at least in larger 
establishments and firms. This also appears to be the case for changes in 
subjective performance over time. Interactions with other practices 
produce results which are unstable across data sets. The effects of FSC 
also vary by scheme type and coverage, with share ownership effects 
tending to be statistically non-significant. Turning to productivity, PRP 
                                                   
10 A meta-analysis reviewing ten studies found share ownership had positive 
productivity effects (Kruse and Blasi, 1995).  However, there are questions about the 
applicability of the evidence for the US on ESOP’s to the British case since ESOP’s tend 
to operate in large firms and attract significant tax breaks. 
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tends to have positive effects, the results for share ownership are more 
diverse, and interactions between FSC mechanisms and other practices 
are unstable over time.  
In all these studies there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the 
effects identified are caused by fair share capitalism. It is likely that there 
is non-random selection of firms and workers into and out of FSC. If this 
selection is correlated with FSC and not accounted for in the analysis 
then it will bias estimates of FSC. That bias may be upwards in cases 
where FSC is proxying the causal effect of being a ‘good employer’ 
where this is otherwise unobservable to the analyst. Omitted variables 
bias may also arise if FSC is picking up an increase in worker morale or 
effort occasioned by other practices linked to FSC such as autonomous 
EDM or better information and consultation with employees. Some of 
the studies reviewed above have used panel data to account for fixed 
differences between FSC and non-FSC employers. However, although 
this paper presents some analyses of the 1998-2004 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey Panel, most of the evidence comes from 
analysis of cross-sectional data. A second concern with cross-sectional 
data is that isolating an independent association between FSC and 
performance is not informative about the direction of causation. Reverse 
causation may affect estimates for PRP in particular, since respondents 
are more likely to identify the presence of PRP when profits are there to 
be shared. It also seems that, to the extent that causal inferences can be 
drawn about the impact of FSC, its effects are heterogeneous with 
respect to the type of FSC scheme, its coverage, its interaction with other 
practices, and the context in which it is found, including firm size. 
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Data and methods 
The data used in this report is based on the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS 2004).11 The paper analyses the 2004 cross-
sectional survey of workplaces linked to employees working in those 
workplaces. With the survey weights used throughout, results are 
nationally representative of workplaces with 5 or more employees in 
Britain. Both the HR manager and employee survey have high response 
rates. In keeping with the rest of the literature analyses are confined to 
the private sector. In addition the 1998-2004 WERS Panel is used to 
analyse switching in FSC regimes. The panel is a follow-up survey of a 
random sub-set of a nationally-representative sample of workplaces with 
10 or more employees interviewed in 1998. 
Measures of labour productivity 
Three measures of labour productivity were analysed. The first is taken 
from HR managers’ responses to the question: ‘Compared with other 
establishments in the same industry, how would you assess your 
workplace’s labour productivity?’ Answers are ordered from ‘a lot better 
than average’ to ‘a lot below average’. The responses ‘a lot below’ and 
‘below average’ are collapsed due to the small number of respondents 
putting their establishment in these categories. Despite the fact that 
subjective ordered measures of productivity dominate the British 
literature there is some debate about the properties of these data and 
their value in estimating influences on productivity compared with 
accounting-type data.12  
The paper compares results using this traditional measure with 
accounting measures collected for the first time in WERS using a 
Financial Performance Questionnaire (FPQ).13 The first accounting-based 
measure is the log of gross output per worker (sometimes referred to as 
‘average labour productivity’) and is derived by dividing total 
employment at the workplace into the total value of sales of goods and 
services over the past year. The second measure is the log of gross 
value-added per worker and is derived by subtracting the total value of 
purchases of goods, materials and services from total sales, and then 
                                                   
11 For full details of the survey see Kersley et al. (2006) and Chaplin et al. (2005). 
12 For a discussion of the merits of alternative measures of productivity see Kersley et 
al. (2006: 287-289). 
13 A copy of the FPQ questionnaire can be downloaded at: 
http://www.wers2004.info/wers2004/crosssection.php#fpq.  A full description of the data 
and how the questionnaire was administered can be found in Chaplin et al. (2005). 
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dividing this figure by total employment.14 Sales per employee and value 
added per employee are highly correlated with one another.15 However, 
the subjective measure of productivity relative to the industry average is 
not correlated with the accounting measures, suggesting that it contains 
different information from the other two dependent variables. 
The response rate to the FPQ was 47 per cent of all workplaces 
participating in WERS. This response rate, together with procedures 
adopted to exclude those with item non-response and outlier values 
reduced the size of the estimation sample for the FPQ productivity 
models compared with analyses of the subjective productivity measure.16 
Of the 1,512 cases with a valid HR manager subjective measure of 
productivity, 6 per cent thought their workplace’s productivity was either 
‘below’ or ‘a lot below average’, 42 per cent thought it was ‘average’, 42 
per cent thought it was ‘better than average’ and 10 per cent described it 
as ‘a lot above average’. Having trimmed the top and bottom 2.5 per cent 
of values, 586 workplaces had valid data for productivity levels measured 
as sales per employee and 524 had valid data for the value-added per 
employee measure of labour productivity. The estimation samples are a 
little lower having dropped a small number of cases with missing data 
on independent variables. 
The survey questions providing data on the FSC variables are given in 
Appendix A. Factor analyses of the five types of performance pay – 
individual payments-by-results, merit pay, group payments-by-results, 
share ownership and profit-related pay – identified two factors with 
eigen values above 1. Individual payments-by-results loaded with merit 
pay, as did share ownership and profit-related pay. Group-level 
payments-by-results had a lower loading which was very similar across 
the two factors.  
The FSC variables were the three group-level performance pay methods 
(share ownership, profit-related pay and group-based payment by 
results). They were combined into an additive scale presented in the last 
row of Table 1. Half of all workplaces had at least one of these pay 
methods and a further 10  per cent had individual PBR or merit pay 
despite having no FSC, leaving 40  per cent of all workplaces having no 
incentive pay at all. Of the 60 per cent of workplaces with some form of 
incentive pay, two-thirds used more than one method, suggesting that 
various forms of incentive pay may be complements rather than 
substitutes.  
                                                   
14 In deriving logged value added per employee for estimation a constant was added to 
push the whole distribution above zero. 
15 Correlation coefficient is 0.39 p=0.0000.  In simple regression of log sales per 
employee log added value per employee had a t-statistic of 8.91. 
16 Most of the data provided related to an accounting period ending in 2004, the 
remainder providing data for a period ending in 2003.  Where data did not relate to a 
full calendar year it was adjusted accordingly.  Workplaces with values below the 2.5th 
percentile and above the 97.5th percentiles of the productivity distributions were 
classified as outliers and removed from the analyses. 
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The 1998-2004 WERS Panel replicates the FSC questions asked in the 
1998 survey. These differ a little from those asked in the 2004 cross-
section survey. For instance, they include deferred PRP schemes. The 
incidence of FSC in the panel of workplaces with 10 or more employees 
in 1998 and 2004 is presented in the first two rows of Table 3. The other 
rows show the percentage of workplaces switching in and out of each 
FSC scheme. The incidence of PRP declined but this is wholly accounted 
for by deferred PRP schemes. The percentage with other PRP schemes 
remained constant at 42 per cent, but there is a great deal of switching 
with 15 per cent of workplaces adopting PRP and 15 per cent ending 
schemes other than the deferred ones. The percentage of workplaces 
with Employee Share Ownership Schemes (ESOS) is constant at 20 per 
cent in both years. Yet 19 per cent of workplaces switch ESOS status in 
the two surveys: 10 per cent adopt ESOS while 9 per cent end their 
schemes. The incidence of PBR, on the other hand, rises markedly: it was 
present in 33 per cent of panel workplaces in 2004, up 10 percentage 
points from 1998. PBR adopters outnumbered those ending PBR by 2:1. 
Table 3. Change in incidence of fair share capitalism schemes, 1998-
2004 
 % workplaces 
 PRP exc 
deferred 
schemes 
All PRP inc 
deferred 
schemes 
Employee share 
ownership 
schemes 
Any PRP/ESOS Payments-by-
results 
All in 1998 42 47 20 48 23 
All in 2004 42 40 20 49 33 
Switching versus 
staying: 
Neither 98 nor 04 
98 not 04 
04 not 98 
98 and 04 
 
 
43 
15 
15 
27 
 
 
40 
18 
13 
29 
 
 
71 
9 
10 
11 
 
 
37 
14 
15 
34 
 
 
58 
9 
18 
15 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Panel Survey 1998-2004. Base: all private sector workplaces with 10 or more employees.  Figures 
are weighted and based on responses from 587 managers. 
 
This amount of switching might be interpreted as experimentation on 
the part of employers in search of the best arrangements or, less 
charitably, as flailing around unsure what to do. Alternatively, it may be 
that what is best, changes over time, and employers alter their practices 
accordingly. Another possibility is that what matters to employers is the 
‘newness’ of a scheme rather than the attributes of a particular payment 
method. Perhaps it is a ‘new’ scheme that affects productivity rather than 
a particular type of scheme? Either way, this amount of switching implies 
marginal gains from incentive pay schemes: if the gains were bigger one 
might expect less switching. It also suggests that these changes are not 
major overhauls in employer practices, implying that the ‘treatments’ 
and the inputs required to maintain them are unlikely to be large. In turn, 
this suggests low switching costs. Evidence from the panel therefore 
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indicates that any productivity effects arising from these schemes are 
unlikely to be huge.  
Measures of employee decision-making 
The report uses measures of EDM taken from both managers and 
employees. Most of the analysis in this paper uses the employer 
perceptions of EDM for employees in the workplace’s largest 
occupational group or ‘core employees’. HR managers were asked:  
“Using the scale on this card, to what extent would you say that 
individuals in [TITLE OF THE LARGEST OCCUPATIONAL GROUP] here 
have variety in their work, discretion over how they do their work, 
control over the pace at which they work, involvement in decisions over 
how their work is organized?” 
The scale on the card was “a lot, some, a little, none”. The distribution 
on each of these items is presented in Table 4. Factor analysis of these 
items produces a single factor with an eigen value of 2.21 and a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.73, suggesting that the items are aspects of a single 
construct. An additive scale was created running from 0 (‘none’ on all 
four items) to 12 (‘a lot’ on all four items). Ten per cent of workplaces 
scored less than 5 on this scale, 47 per cent scored between 5 and 8, and 
44 per cent scored 9 or more.  
Table 4. Employer perceptions of employee decision-making, 2004  
 % workplaces 
 None A little Some A lot 
Extent to which core employees 
have: 
    
Variety in work 3 13 38 46 
Discretion over how do work 6 23 43 28 
Control over pace 8 24 41 26 
Involvement in decisions over 
how work organised 
8 19 44 28 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004. Base: all private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees.  Figures are weighted 
and are based on 1,706 workplace respondents. 
 
Employees were asked: “In general, how much influence do you have 
over the following….What tasks you do in your job, the pace at which 
you work, how you do your work, the order in which you carry out tasks, 
the time you start or finish your working day?” with responses coded 
with the same scale as that used for employers. Factor analysis reveals a 
factor with an eigen value of 3.01 and a Cronbach alpha of 0.82. An 
additive scale was produced scoring items as per the employer-based 
EDM scale, presented in Table 5. Because there were five questions the 
scale ran from (0, 15). Thirteen per cent of employees scored fewer than 
6, thirty eight per cent scored between 6 and 10, and forty nine per cent 
scored 11 or more with thirteen per cent scoring the maximum 15.  
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Table 5. Employee perceptions of employee decision-making, 2004  
 % workplaces 
 None A little Some A lot 
Extent to which core employees 
have: 
    
Influence over the tasks they do 12 14 36 38 
Control over the pace of work 11 15 35 39 
How they do their work 4 11 33 52 
Order tasks are carried out 6 11 33 50 
Influence over time start or finish 
work 
35 16 24 26 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004. Base: all private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees.  Figures are weighted 
and are based on between 15,131 and 16,006 employees. 
 
In regression models controlling for firm size and the nature of the core 
employees at the workplace the additive scale for EDM based on 
managerial perceptions was positively associated with each of the five 
employee perceptions of EDM.17 The additive scale for employer 
perceptions of EDM is positively correlated with the additive employee 
EDM scale in regressions controlling for firm size and the nature of core 
employees (coefficient is 0.12 t=5.17).18 This indicates that the employer’s 
perception of EDM is a good indicator of employees’ own perceptions in 
that workplace. One reason for this is that employees’ perceptions of 
their own decision-making autonomy are not idiosyncratic but are 
affected, to a large degree, by the workplace employing them. This is 
confirmed in a regression containing workplace dummy variables: these 
workplace fixed effects account for 19 per cent of the variance in the 
employee additive scale of EDM. 
Both the employer and employee perceptions of EDM were strongly 
correlated with employee satisfaction with ‘scope for using your own 
initiative’ and ‘involvement in decision-making at this workplace’.19 
Assuming that most workers express greater satisfaction with EDM the 
more they have, these findings suggest that both employer and 
employee perceptions of decision-making autonomy were indeed 
capturing EDM.  
Measures of managerial monitoring of employee effort 
WERS 2004 contains a range of managerial monitoring (MM) measures. 
They are presented in Table 6. They show that four-fifths of workplaces 
                                                   
17 The coefficients ranged between 0.02 and 0.03 and were statistically significant at a 
99 per cent confidence level or above. 
18 As one might expect the correlation was a little stronger when the analysis of 
employee perceptions of EDM were confined to the core employees which the 
managers’ scale applied to. 
19 In ordered probit models using the same set of independent variables used later in 
the productivity analysis, plus additional individual-level characteristics, the employer 
EDM scale was positive and significant with a t-statistic of around 4.  The employee 
EDM scale had a t-value ranging from 31 to 44 depending on the model.  These models 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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used managers or supervisors to monitor the quality of work and over 
one-third expected employees themselves to perform this role. One-
quarter of workplaces used inspectors in separate departments while 
over two-fifths used customer surveys. It is usually assumed that FSC is 
used where MM of inputs is either costly, difficult or both, whereas FSC 
entails MM of outputs in order to reward performance. Although the 
distinction between MM of inputs and outputs is important theoretically, 
it is difficult to distinguish the two empirically with the WERS data. 
Customer surveys and inspectors in other departments can only monitor 
outputs, not inputs, since they are forms of monitoring that are not 
physically proximate to the employee. Managers/supervisors and 
individual employees, on the other hand, are likely to be physically 
proximate to the worker who is being monitored. In this case monitoring 
may cover both inputs and outputs.  
Three of the variables relate to monitoring through appraisal systems 
which sociologists classify as part of ‘bureaucratic control’ of workers, as 
noted earlier. Such systems are likely to involve MM of both inputs and 
outputs. A dummy variable captures workplaces that have labour 
productivity targets and keep records of them, denoting a system which 
is devoting substantial resources to monitoring labour outputs. Another 
dummy variable identifies workplaces with supervisors who can dismiss 
employees for unsatisfactory performance, an indicator of 
management’s ability to enforce effort through traditional forms of what 
Edwards (1979) described as ‘personal control’. In total, there are eleven 
items capturing MM of inputs and outputs. An additive scale simply 
counting the number of methods used at the workplace indicates a 
normally distributed curve peaking at two methods. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for this measure is 0.58.  
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Table 6. Managerial monitoring of employee effort, 2004 
 % workplaces 
How monitor quality of work: 
 Managers/supervisors 
 Inspectors in separate department 
 Individual employees 
 Records kept on faults/complaints 
 Customer Surveys 
 Other ways 
 
82 
25 
37 
44 
38 
8 
Appraisal systems: 
 All non-managerial employees have performance formally appraised 
 Non-managerial appraisals conducted half yearly or quarterly 
 Non-managerial pay is linked to performance appraisal 
 
57 
21 
26 
Have labour productivity target and keep records 28 
Some/all supervisors can dismiss employees for unsatisfactory performance 9 
Number of monitoring methods (0,11 count)* 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 
1 
15 
18 
16 
17 
11 
11 
6 
4 
1 
1 
<1 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004. Note: the (0,11) count is an additive scale scoring 1 every time the workplace has 
one of the monitoring methods identified in the first 4 rows of the table. Base: all private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees.  Figures 
are weighted and are based on 1,706 workplace respondents. 
 
Analysis 
The analysis proceeded as follows. First, the workplace correlates of FSC 
were identified, focusing on the relationship between FSC, EDM, and 
MM bearing in mind the expectation that FSC and EDM should be 
positively correlated while there is some uncertainty about the 
relationship between FSC and MM. The discussion above suggests that 
FSC may be negatively correlated with MM of inputs but positively 
correlated with MM of outputs.  
Then the link between FSC and labour productivity was investigated 
using the three measures of productivity. The first set of models 
(Appendix B, Table B1) incorporates indicators of FSC presence, thus 
testing the proposition that what matters for productivity is whether or 
not particular FSC schemes are in place. The second set of models 
(Appendix B, Table B2) replaces the FSC incidence variables with FSC 
employee coverage variables to test the proposition that what matters is 
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the comprehensive coverage of FSC schemes, rather than their mere 
presence. The third set of models (Appendix B, Table B3) tests for 
interactions between FSC schemes to see if bundles of FSC practices 
have different effects. Throughout, models are run for the whole private 
sector sample followed by models for workplaces with high and low 
EDM to test the interaction of FSC with EDM.  
All models are run with sampling weights that are the inverse of the 
probability of sample selection. The weights for the FPQ productivity 
models also adjust for non-response to the FPQ.20 A robust estimator is 
used to account for heteroskedasticity. The paper makes no attempt to 
tackle the potential endogeneity of FSC. As noted earlier, it is likely that 
there is non-random selection of firms and workers into FSC, some of 
which will not be accounted for by the controls in our analysis. This may 
well upwardly bias estimates of FSC’s ‘impact’ on productivity.21 
                                                   
20 For full details see Chaplin et al. (2005). 
21 Due to limited space, there are other aspects of the FSC-productivity link not pursued 
in this paper, including heterogeneous effects by firm size and product strategy. 
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5 
Results 
Factors associated with fair share capitalism 
Table 7 estimates factors associated with FSC. FSC is treated as an 
ordinal variable estimated with ordered probit models. Individual 
payments-by-results and the introduction of performance-based pay in 
the previous two years were positively associated with FSC whereas 
merit pay was negatively signed but non-significant. MM was positively 
associated with FSC, the association strengthening with the number of 
MM methods. Breaking the additive MM scale into its component parts 
(Model 2), only the use of inspectors to monitor quality and linking pay 
to performance at appraisal were positively associated with FSC. The 
power of supervisors to dismiss workers for poor performance was 
negatively associated with FSC at a 90 per cent confidence level. As 
anticipated, FSC was significantly associated with EDM, though the 
association was only apparent when using managerial perceptions of 
EDM and the association was only significant at a 90 per cent confidence 
level.  
An alternative way to assess the effects of FSC on EDM in cross-sectional 
data is to identify those factors associated with initiatives to introduce 
performance-based pay. Probit analyses for the introduction of 
performance-based pay in the previous two years revealed a positive, 
independent association with initiatives to increase employee 
involvement.22 This is consistent with the proposition that employers do 
seek to link FSC with EDM. 
It is arguable that, if FSC was to have a substantial effect on productivity, 
it should operate as an efficiency wage raising wages rather than simply 
‘repackaging’ wages. Regressions for individuals’ wages indicated that 
this was not the case. It is also possible, given the theory regarding FSC 
as a form of risk-sharing between employers and employees, that 
workplace pay might be more variable in the presence of FSC. In fact, 
FSC was not significantly associated with the workplace-level pay 
distribution.23 Taken together, these results indicate FSC was not 
significantly associated with wage outcomes for employees, so that one 
might not anticipate strong productivity effects if the magnitude of the 
pay-back is what mattered. On the other hand, if it is simply the link 
between pay and FSC that matters, productivity effects might 
nevertheless arise.  
                                                   
22 The analyses reported in this paragraph are available from the authors on request. 
23 The only incentive pay scheme associated with gross hourly pay was individual PBR, 
which was associated with higher wages.  These models are available from the authors 
on request. 
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Table 7. Ordered Probit models for fair share capitalism, 2004 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Incentive pay variables:   
Individual payments-by-results 0.578 0.612 
 (4.84)** (5.08)** 
Merit pay -0.163 -0.214 
 (1.19) (1.54) 
Introduction of performance-based pay in last 2 years 0.627 0.604 
 (4.29)** (4.16)** 
Managerial perceptions of employee decision-making  0.037 0.035 
 (1.86) (1.69) 
Managerial monitoring variables:   
MM count (0,11) 0.115  
 (4.87)**  
MM: manager/supervisor  -0.041 
  (0.31) 
MM: inspectors  0.284 
  (2.54)* 
MM: individual employees  0.049 
  (0.47) 
MM: records kept on faults and complaints  0.098 
  (0.85) 
MM: customer surveys  0.156 
  (1.33) 
MM: other methods  0.019 
  (0.11) 
Has labour productivity targets/records  0.119 
  (1.23) 
Non-managerial pay is linked to performance appraisal  0.317 
  (2.98)** 
Non-managerial appraisals conducted half-yearly or quarterly  0.034 
  (0.31) 
All non-managerial employees have performance appraisal  0.033 
  (0.29) 
Supervisors can dismiss employees for poor performance  -0.255 
  (1.78) 
cut1:Constant 1.524 1.300 
 (4.06)** (3.27)** 
cut2:Constant 2.601 2.391 
 (6.78)** (5.90)** 
cut3:Constant 3.788 3.596 
 (9.63)** (8.63)** 
Model fit F(33,1646)=11.45 
P>F = .0000 
F(44,1635)=9.25 
P>F = .0000 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004. Cross section. Base: All private sector workplaces with non-missing data. N=1,679 
1. Dependent variable is FSC (0,3) which is an additive scale for group payments-by-results, profit-related pay and employee share ownership 
schemes. 
2. T-statistics in parentheses. *=statistically significant at 95% confidence level; **=statistically significant at 99% confidence level. 
 
All models contain the following controls: firm size (3 dummies), single 
establishment, SIC (12 dummies), workplace aged 25+ years, foreign 
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owned, union recognition, occupation of core employees (9 dummies), 
many competitors, market for product/service is growing, managers are 
15%+ of employees, supervisors are 20%+ of non-managerial 
employees, 60%+ employees use computers in daily duties, no 
employees regularly working from home. 
Links between fair share capitalism and productivity 
Appendix Table B1 estimates the association between the incidence of 
FSC and the three measures of labour productivity. Models (1) to (3) 
estimate ordered probits for the subjective measure of labour 
productivity relative to the industry average; models (4) to (6) estimate 
log sales per employee and models (7) to (9) estimate log value added 
per employee. In each case, the first model is for the whole private 
sector, the second is for workplaces with high EDM (those scoring more 
than 7 on the EDM scale of zero to 12) and the third is for workplaces 
with low EDM. The model fit statistics indicate that a reasonable 
percentage of the variance in labour productivity is accounted for by the 
models, with the explained variance rising when the sample is split by 
high and low EDM. 
Share ownership schemes are positively associated with labour 
productivity on all three measures. In each case the association is 
stronger in high EDM workplaces, though the differential is not 
particularly pronounced. PRP only has statistically significant effects for 
one of the measures (value added per employee), where it is positively 
associated with productivity in high-EDM workplaces and negatively 
associated with productivity in low-EDM workplaces. Taken together 
these results are suggestive of complementarity between some forms of 
FSC and EDM. Group PBR remains non-significant throughout, as does 
the recent introduction of performance-based pay. Individual financial 
incentives are also associated with labour productivity, individual PBR 
having a negative association with accounting measures of productivity 
in low-EDM workplaces, while merit pay is positively associated with 
value-added in low-EDM workplaces. The effects of EDM for the whole 
private sector are unclear: it is weakly positively associated with the 
subjective measure of labour productivity and weakly negatively 
associated with sales per employee. Similarly, the results from MM are 
unclear: it is positively associated with the subjective measure of labour 
productivity and negatively associated with sales per employee in high-
EDM workplaces. 
Appendix Table B2 runs models identical to those in Appendix Table B1 
but replaces the incidence of profit-related pay and share ownership 
schemes with their coverage of employees. This results in a marginal 
improvement in the fit of the models. Share ownership has a stronger 
positive association with labour productivity when 100 per cent of non-
managerial employees are covered by a scheme, a finding that is 
apparent for all three measures of productivity. This result also holds in 
high EDM and low-EDM workplaces – with the exception of value-added 
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per employee in high-EDM workplaces. Managerial-only share schemes 
had little effect on productivity, except in the case of value-added per 
employee where they were negatively associated with productivity in 
low-EDM workplaces. Results are very different with respect to PRP: 
although there is some evidence in support of the comprehensiveness 
thesis in the whole sample and high-EDM samples when estimating the 
subjective measure of productivity relative to the industry average, there 
is no support for the thesis using the accounting measures of 
productivity. If anything, 100 per cent PRP schemes are associated with 
lower value-added per employee than having no scheme at all or having 
a scheme with partial coverage. So, whereas the ESOS results lend some 
support to the comprehensiveness thesis outlined earlier, the PRP results 
do not. 
Appendix Table B3 replaces the FSC coverage variables with interactions 
between PRP, ESOS and group PBR to test the proposition that what 
matters is the mix of financial incentives, rather than their incidence in 
isolation or their coverage of employees. The new variables do not 
improve the fit of the models but they are informative since they indicate 
that the combination of FSC schemes is crucial to understanding their 
association with labour productivity. Single schemes in isolation – PRP, 
ESOS or group PBR – are either not significantly associated with labour 
productivity, or are negatively associated with it. This is true of share 
ownership schemes which in earlier models tended to be positively 
associated with labour productivity. The negative association between 
share ownership and labour productivity is particularly marked in high-
EDM workplaces. However, where share ownership exists in 
combination with either profit-related pay or group PBR, it is positively 
associated with labour productivity. These effects are less pronounced in 
low-EDM workplaces, with the exception of the combination of share 
ownership and group PBR which is only positively associated with value-
added per employee in low-EDM workplaces. The effects of having all 
three FSC schemes together are not overwhelming: their effect in 
combination is only positively associated with the subjective measure of 
labour productivity in the whole sample model. Taken together these 
results indicate clearly that FSC’s associations with labour productivity 
depend on the combination of FSC schemes and its interaction with 
EDM.  
To get some understanding of the importance of these FSC interaction 
effects, the Venn diagram in Figure 1 shows the incidence of FSC 
combinations in the private sector. The diagram covers half of all 
workplaces with 5 or more employees in the private sector: the other half 
have no group-based incentive payments at all. Around half of those 
with some FSC have single isolated schemes, that is, the regime that 
performed so poorly in the labour productivity models in Table 3 in 
Appendix B. The remainder combine ESOS, PRP and group PBR in some 
way, with 6 per cent of private sector workplaces having all three 
schemes. The combination of ESOS and PRP which performed so well is 
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Performance Related 
Pay 
(34%) 
Employee Share 
Ownership Scheme 
(20%) 
Group Payment-by-
results 
(26%) 
6% 
3% 
6% 8% 
8% 5% 
14% 
only present in 6 per cent of private sector workplaces, which the 
combination of ESOS and group PBR accounts for another 3 percent. 
 
Figure 1. Incidence of fair share capitalism combinations 
Source: 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. Base: 1706 
1.  Any fair share capitalism: 50% 
2. No fair share capitalism: 50% 
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Summary 
Fair share capitalism is positively associated with labour productivity. 
Although FSC effects varied with the measure of labour productivity 
used, results were fairly consistent across the three productivity 
measures.  
FSC effects differed by type of FSC scheme. Share ownership schemes 
had the clearest positive association with productivity. However, 
interactions between FSC schemes revealed that this positive association 
was confined to instances in which share ownership schemes were 
combined with profit-related pay or group payments-by-results schemes. 
In isolation, share ownership was associated with lower productivity, as 
were PRP and group PBR in isolation. 
Employee coverage of FSC schemes also mattered. The positive 
association between share ownership and productivity was most 
pronounced when all non-managerial employees were covered by the 
scheme, lending some support to the ‘comprehensiveness’ thesis 
outlined earlier. However, this was not apparent in the case of PRP. 
Other financial incentives such as individual PBR and merit pay were 
rarely associated with productivity. Nor was the recent introduction of 
performance-based pay. 
Perhaps most striking of all was the fact that the positive links between 
FSC and productivity were much stronger in high EDM workplaces than 
in low EDM workplaces, a finding one might have expected given the 
theory governing the conditions under which one would expect FSC to 
improve productivity. 
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6 
Discussion and 
conclusions 
The traditional rationale for fair share capitalism is that where employers 
find it difficult or costly to monitor inputs they will choose to pay for 
outputs. FSC can then be used to align worker and employer objectives 
in maximising those outputs, provided any free-rider problem from 
group FSC can be overcome. This implies a potential to reduce 
managerial monitoring (MM) of inputs where one is able to reward 
outputs through FSC. At the same time, it seems likely that employers 
will only want to link pay to performance, and employees will only be 
prepared to shoulder the additional risk to their income of doing so, 
where there is autonomy in employee decision-making (EDM) which 
permits employees to affect output.  
Using nationally representative British workplace data the paper shows 
FSC is positively associated with employer perceptions of EDM, but not 
employee perceptions of EDM. At the same time, FSC is strongly 
positively associated with MM. To the extent that our MM variables are 
measuring the monitoring of outputs, this is to be expected. In fact, as 
discussed earlier, our MM proxies are likely to identify the monitoring of 
both inputs and outputs. Although a traditional principal-agent 
perspective would indicate that FSC and MM may be substitutes for one 
another, Edwards (1979) and others have identified FSC as one aspect of 
the ‘technical control’ over workers, one which may complement control 
through close supervision (‘personal control’) and through adherence to 
norms and codes, often embodied in appraisal, through which job 
progression is assured (‘bureaucratic control’). From this theoretical 
perspective it is perhaps less surprising to find MM and FSC co-existing. 
Furthermore, the falling costs of ICT-based MM may have contributed to 
more pervasive MM.  
Fair Share Capitalism is positively associated with labour productivity. 
Although its effects varied with the measure of labour productivity used, 
results were fairly consistent across the three productivity measures. 
FSC effects differed by type of FSC scheme. Share ownership schemes 
had the clearest positive association with productivity. However, 
interactions between FSC schemes revealed that this positive association 
was confined to instances in which share ownership schemes were 
combined with profit-related pay or group payments-by-results schemes. 
In isolation, share ownership was associated with lower productivity, as 
were PRP and group PBR in isolation. Employee coverage of FSC 
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schemes also mattered. The positive association between share 
ownership and productivity was most pronounced when all non-
managerial employees were covered by the scheme, lending some 
support to the ‘comprehensiveness’ thesis outlined earlier. This was not 
apparent in the case of PRP. Other financial incentives such as individual 
PBR and merit pay were rarely associated with productivity. Nor was the 
recent introduction of performance-based pay. Perhaps most striking of 
all was the fact that the positive links between FSC and productivity were 
much stronger in high EDM workplaces than in low EDM workplaces, a 
finding one might have expected given the theory governing the 
conditions under which one would expect FSC to improve productivity. 
The data contain no information on the size of the pay-off to workers 
arising from FSC. In wage equations, only individual payments-by-
results were associated with higher wages, and FSC had no effect on the 
workplace wage distribution. Furthermore, there was a great deal of 
switching between schemes in the 1998-2004 panel survey. Together, 
these findings suggest that the FSC in Britain is not perhaps the 
strongest form of FSC, and may have a less significant impact on pay 
than in the United States. Any effect it has on productivity may arise 
from the fact of a link between pay and performance, rather than the size 
of payments. 
There are a number of caveats to these findings. First, the analysis takes 
no account of the potential endogeneity of FSC, so one might expect the 
results to be an upper bound estimate of FSC effects on productivity. In 
any event, the paper can make no strong claims to having identified the 
causal relationship between FSC and productivity. Second, the data 
contain no information at employee-level as to who receives various 
forms of FSC. Therefore one can not link incentive payments directly to 
employee-level outcomes such as motivation and commitment so the 
paper has little to say about what lies in the ‘black box’ linking FSC to 
productivity. It is possible to do more with WERS in this respect, 
however, by looking at FSC links to labour turnover, absenteeism and 
other outcomes relative to productivity. Third, the paper presents no 
evidence on the link between FSC and financial performance. It is unclear 
what the net benefits of FSC might be to employers, even when there are 
productivity gains, if these can be outweighed by the costs of adoption 
and maintenance of FSC. Fourth, there is little investigation of the 
potential heterogeneity of FSC gains to different sorts of workplace, 
other than with respect to EDM. For instance, there are good reasons to 
suspect that what is suitable for larger employers may be less so for 
smaller employers. One might also expect FSC returns to differ 
according to factors such as the product market employers operate in, 
the skill levels of their workforce, and the existence of other employment 
practices that are either supportive of or run counter to FSC. Finally, 
future papers will consider the productivity effects of tax inducements to 
adopt FSC.  
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Appendix A: Description 
of fair share capitalism 
variables:  
 
The FSC measures presented in the report are derived from the following 
survey questions. 
Payments-by-results (PBR) 
“Do any of the employees in this establishment get paid by results or 
receive merit pay? On this card is an explanation of what we mean by 
payment by results and merit pay.” 
Card reads:  
1. Payment by results  
‘Payment by results’ includes any method of payment where he pay is 
determined by the amount done or its value, rather than just the 
number of hours worked. It includes commission, and bonuses that 
are determined by individual, establishment or organisation 
productivity or performance. It does not include profit-related pay 
schemes.  
2. Merit pay  
‘Merit pay’ is related to a subjective assessment of individual 
performance by a supervisor or manager.  
Follow-up questions establish the occupations covered by PBR and the 
percentage of non-managerial employees covered. In addition the 
following question establishes whether PBR is calculated at individual, 
group or organisation level: 
“Thinking just about payment by results, what / What) measures of 
performance are used to determine the amount that employees 
receive?”  
PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None'.  
1) Individual performance/output,  
2) Group or team performance/output,  
3) Workplace-based measures,  
4) Organisation-based measures,  
5) Other measures 
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Profit-related pay (PRP) 
“Do any employees at this workplace receive profit-related payments or 
profit-related bonuses?”  
Follow-up questions establish the occupations covered by PRP, the 
percentage of non-managerial employees covered, and the percentage in 
receipt of PRP payments. In addition the following question establishes 
the organisational level at which PRP is calculated if the workplace is part 
of a larger organisation: 
“For what part of your organisation is the amount of profit-related pay 
calculated….Workplace, Division/Subsidiary company, Organisation as a 
whole?”  
Employee share ownership schemes (ESOS) 
“Does this company operate any of the employee share schemes listed 
on this card for any of the employees at this workplace?  
PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None'.  
1) Share Incentive Plan (SIP),  
2)Save As You Earn (SAYE or Sharesave),  
3) Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI),  
4) Company Share Option Plan (CSOP),  
5)Other employee share scheme,  
6) None of these”  
Card reads:  
1 Share Incentive Plan (SIP) – a tax and NIC advantaged plan where 
employees can purchase shares and companies can give employees free 
shares or matching shares  
2 Save As You Earn (SAYE or Sharesave) share options scheme – tax 
advantaged scheme where employees save to purchase their employer’s 
shares.  
3 Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) - where smaller companies 
can grant up to a total of £3 million of tax and NIC advantaged share 
options to their employees 
4 Company Share Option Plan (CSOP) – where companies can grant each 
of their employees up to £30,000 of tax and NIC advantaged share 
options  
5 Other employee share scheme  
Subsequent questions identify the occupations eligible for share 
ownership schemes and the percentage participating in schemes. 
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Performance-related pay 
Over the past two years has management here introduced any of the 
changes listed on this card? PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None'.:  
1) Introduction of performance related pay  
2) Introduction or upgrading of computers  
3) Introduction or upgrading of other types of new technology  
4) Changes in working time arrangements  
5) Changes in the organisation of work  
6) Changes in work techniques or procedures  
7) Introduction of initiatives to involve employees  
8) Introduction of technologically new or significantly improved product 
or service  
9) None of these  
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